Fourth War Patrol

November 29, 1942 - January 24, 1943

Commanding Officer - Lieutenant Commander B.F. McMahon

Sinkings and Damages - USS Drum (SS-228) War Patrol Four

Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

Prologue
1. Narrative
2. Weather
3. Tidal Information
4. Navigational Aids
5. Description of All Ships Sighted
6. Description of All Planes Sighted
7. Particulars of Attack
8. Enemy A/S Measures
9. Major Defects Experienced
10. Radio Reception
11. Sound Conditions and Density Layers
12. Health and Habitability
13. Miles Steamed
14. Fuel Oil Expended
15. Factors of Endurance Remaining
16. Patrol Termination
17. Remarks

Prologue

Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H. on November 8, 1942 from Third War Patrol. Commenced refit on November 9, 1942 by Submarine Base personnel. On November 14, 1942, Lieut. Comdr. R.H. Rice, U.S. Navy was relieved as Commanding Officer by Lieut. Comdr. B.F. McMahon, U.S. Navy. Completed refit on November 23, 1942. SJ radar installed. Commenced training period on November 24, 1942. Completed on November 26, 1942. Readiness for sea date, November 29, 1942. Not depermed nor wiped.

(1.) Narrative

(2.) Weather

The weather during this patrol was not worthy for the number of days of rough seas and overcast skies experienced. We had approximately forty percent (40%) of days when the seas were so rough that depth control at periscope depth was extremely difficult. The large number of overcast days made position keeping difficult, particularly in view of the strong northeast currents encountered during January.

(3.) Tidal Information

The flood and ebb of the tides effect the currents off the east coast of Kyushu, being northerly during the flood, and southerly during the ebb tide; the southerly current being the stronger of the two.

Drifts as high as three (3) to three and five tenths (3.5) knots were experienced in the Kuroshio during January, in the vicinity of the southeast corner of the operating area.

(4.) Navigational Aids

While engaged in planting mines, a gas buoy, red and white striped, was observed in Lat. 32-49 N., Long. 132-12 E. This is believed to be a marker for mid-channel, for night entrance and exit.

The following lights were observed to be burning with normal characteristics: Okino Shima, Tosaki Hana, and Shimanoura. Toi Misaki light was seen to be burning, but with altered characteristics.

(5.) Description of All Ships Sighted

(6.) Description of All Planes Sighted

(7.) Particulars of Attack

REMARKS: This approach and attack was beautifully simple, and was reminiscent of the peace time practice runs of the simplest kind. The target was picked up at 16,000 yards, her course and speed were determined, and the boat placed on a course for a 100° track, from which we did not deviate thereafter. Although it was expected that the attack would have to be made through a barrage of depth charges, we were not picked up by the destroyer, who crossed our bow blissfully unaware of our presence. Since our fire control data was good and our position was excellent, it is difficult to understand why we hit only with two (2) torpedoes. We believe that our first two torpedoes hit, as this checks with our data. The first hit is believed to have detonated by contact, as it exploded with a sharp crack. The second exploded by influence, as it had the muffled and reverberating sound characteristic of such explosions. The first torpedo hit directly under the break in the flight deck, and the second about 150 feet abaft the first.

This carrier checked very closely with pictures and descriptions we possess of the "Ryujo" although to the Commanding Officer, she looked much larger than 8000 tons. Her flight deck was completely covered with planes, which are believed to have been the "Aichi" "99N" dive bombers. The planes were olive drab color, with a yellow stripe around the after part of the fuselage and a yellow or orange disk forward of the stripe.

The destroyer was of the "Asashio" type and had red and white bands around her stack. She patrolled ahead about 1000 to 1500 yards, and employed no supersonic echo ranging. The course was 140°(T), speed 14 knots.

The carrier was using the constant helm method of zig-zagging. The screw counts were: carrier - 170 R.P.M.; destroyer - 150 R.P.M.

After the torpedoes hit, the carrier screws stopped and were not heard again. Sound reported the usual crackling noises of a torpedoed ship for an hour afterward.

It is unfortunate that we were forced down after we surfaced, and were unable to investigate thoroughly the large gasoline slick, as it may have revealed something interesting.

REMARKS: This attack was the first one made by this Commanding Officer, using data furnished entirely by the SJ radar. At no time was the target itself sufficiently clear to permit obtaining accurate bearings or estimates of her course by eye. The destroyer, however, passed close aboard and was plainly visible. Why he did not see us as well is uncomprehensible, except that we had the advantage of the background. Radar definitely reported three (3) targets, one at a greater and one at a lesser range than the large ship. This therefore, was a valuable ship, but its identity cannot be definitely established. The Commanding Officer saw (and this was corroborated by two lookouts and the O.O.D.) a long low shape with a low superstructure jutting up amidships. With this description it would appear that the ship was a large tanker. It is certain that we hit him with one torpedo and possibly with two. The Commanding Officer cannot vouch for the explosion reported by the torpedo room, as it was not heard by the control party. However, at this point the conning tower was not completely submerged and this may be the explanation. Our fire control data was considered good, as we had the target on the plot over a considerable length of time, and were able to check and recheck his course and speed at 160°(T), 11 knots.

After the first two depth charges were dropped, apparently indiscriminately, the whole target group changed bearing to the westward, and it was ten (10) minutes before any determined search was made by the destroyers. It is believed that the target was heading either for Ariake Wan, or for the nearest beach, although her screws were not heard again after the torpedo explosion.

It is believed that we completely fooled the escorts by taking a northerly course to retire. Or it may be that they believed the attack to have been made from the port side. At any rate, all their efforts to find us were concentrated to the southward, and thereby enabled us to surface during the night and clear the area, which undoubtedly got a good going over in the morning.

REMARKS: It is possible that this ship was the same or one similar to the Q-ship encountered by the TRIGGER in this same vicinity. She was about 5000 tons, MFM composite superstructure, similar to Palao Maru. The explosions heard may have been depth charges dropped by this ship or by the other vessel whose screws were heard after the explosions.

This approach was conducted entirely by sound, as our bow planes were practically useless, and with the heavy seas running, broaching at periscope depth was certain. The Commanding Officer knew the chances of hitting were very small under the above conditions, but since the TDC set-up checked very well with the sound bearings, he could not resist the temptation to fire anyway, and trust to luck.

(8.) Enemy A/S Measures

This area is very well patrolled, particularly the line approximating course 160°(T) from the entrance to Bungo Suido. It should be noted that all patrols were sighted at night. Only two (2) sampans were seen during daylight. No patrols were encountered close to the coast. It is evident that the patrols are concentrating at the intersection on the aforesaid 160° course line, with the steamer lane from Van Diemen straits to the northeastward to Muroto Saki and Shiono Misaki. Patrolling is done by old destroyers and craft which resemble submarine chasers. It is believed that these boats return to their anchorages at daylight.

(9.) Major Defects Experienced

"A" Engineering

(a) December 11, 1942 - Main Control Panel in Maneuvering Room (See BuEng Dwg. No. SS228-862-1379 Alt. 1). A hinge pin in the operating lever linkage for contacts, piece 4 came partially out due to its set screw being broken. This jammed the linkage, making it impossible to put the port motor starting lever into series position (to close piece 4). This put the port motors out of commission for about 20 minutes, while the trouble was located and the pin and set screw replaced.

The trouble was first thought to be caused by the "75% field" interlock not operating, and the interlock solenoid was removed for inspection. It was put back in slight misalignment causing another casualty on December 12.

(b) December 12, 1942 - Main Control Panel in Maneuvering Room (See Contractors Dwg. No. 32-J-441). Due to having been improperly aligned when replaced on December 111, the plunger core (piece 33) jammed in its recess in the port motor starter slide (piece 2), making it impossible to move the port starter lever. The interlock was removed, thoroughly tested and found to be in good condition. It was then replaced and carefully aligned. No further trouble has been experienced.

(c) December 16, 1942 - Lost main power, due to tripping out of battery tank contactors (Contractors Dwg. No. 11-A-4481-1). While making a quick dive, in shifting propulsion from engines to battery, the battery tank contactors tripped out. (The positive side contactor in the forward battery well and both positive and negative contactors in the after battery well). Contactors were reset by hand. Subsequent investigation showed that the contactors were set to trip at 14 Kiloamps, which is the minimum setting. Settings of all contactors were increased to 19 Kiloamps.

(d) All main engine outboard exhaust valves leaked. No's. 2 and 3 leaked most frequently. No leaks encountered unless making a quick dive with main engines on propulsion immediately prior to the dive. Cause thought possibly to be due to back pressure in exhaust header, preventing the valve from making a good seat, or to contraction of the valve disc when cooled, after sealing.

(e) The port reduction gear lube oil sump tank leaked, allowing salt water to get into the reduction gear lube oil. An unsuccessful attempt to find and stop the leak was made during the last refit. More effective measures should be taken during this overhaul.

(f) SJ radar. Shortly after leaving Pearl Harbor, resistor R-104 in the oscillator converter unit burned out, causing resistors R-51.1 and R-51.2 to burn out in the transmitter receiver unit. This defect was corrected by Submarine Force, Midway.

The training motor proved too small to carry the load and heated excessively. It was used only sparingly in order to prevent a total casualty.

The training shafts and gears were not properly aligned during installation. As a result, the entire unit was hard to operate, and was very noisy. Misalignment may have been partly responsible for excessive heating of the motor.

"B" Hull

(a) The attack periscope fogged intermittently during the latter part of the patrol.

(b) The trim pump was, as usual, noisy. Early correction of this defect is strongly recommended.

(c) The sheer pins in the bow plane shafting sheered when the planes were nearly in the rigged-in position, during surfacing in a heavy sea. These pins were replaced and the planes rigged in. Again the pins sheered, and again they were replaced. Upon examination of the rigging system, it was discovered that the port sector gear was meshed with the starboard sector gear, four (4) teeth in advance of its normal position; and that the rigging out stop in the port sector gear was carried away. This resulted in the port plane returning to its normal rigged-in position, while the starboard plane was still slightly rigged-out.

On subsequent dives, the planes were rigged out by hand, care being taken not to go to the full rigged-out position; thus preventing the sector gears from again unmeshing. The planes tilted satisfactorily in this uneven position, however, as an added precaution, no more than ten (10) degrees tilt was put on them.

(10.) Radio Reception

Radio reception was complete.

Last consecutive serial number sent - 170900.

Last consecutive serial number received - 240725.

Much difficulty was experienced in transmitting to NPM.

Radar: The SJ radar performed very efficiently. The Commanding Officer cannot praise this equipment too highly. It proved itself invaluable on many occasions. It is regretted that more opportunities to use it for attack were not presented.

Our experience with the SJ radar equipment has shown that the following results may be expected: (a) Large ships will be picked up at 14,000 - 15,000 yards; also any ship picked up at this range is at once identified as a large ship. (b) Destroyers will be picked up at from 8,000 to 10,000 yards. (c) Large sized sampans and patrol boats will be picked up at 5,000 - 7,000 yards. (d) Wooden sampans will not be picked up, or may give a ragged pip at ranges under 4,000 yards.

Our radar operators became proficient in recognizing the character of pips, and were correct in their judgement on every occasion. On the night of 5 January, the large vessel was picked up first and at a shorter range the operator readily recognized first one and then a second destroyer escort; one at a lesser and one at a greater range than the target ship. Without this information the Commanding Officer would have been unable to form a correct estimate of the situation.

The radar proved itself invaluable defensively also, as it prevented us from running up on a patrolling destroyer on several occasions.

The performance of the SD radar was excellent.

ARC-1. This device was used frequently, but no indications of Japanese radar were noted.

(11.) Sound Conditions and Density Layers

Sound conditions were poor to fair, best ranges being about 3000 yards. No density layers were observed.

(12.) Health and Habitability

Health and habitability were excellent. Normal meal hours were observed. The food on this patrol was exceptionally good. Morale of the crew is excellent.

(13.) Miles steamed enroute to and from station 10620.

(14.) Fuel expended 109,511 gallons.

(15.) Factors of Endurance Remaining

(16.) This patrol was ended by provisions of the operation order.

(17.) Remarks - miscellaneous

The officers and men of this ship conducted themselves in accordance with the highest traditions of the Navy during this patrol. Their tireless efforts and attention to duty were remarkable under all conditions.

This patrol was disappointing in the small number of contacts in the area. More time was spent out of the area than was the intention of the Commanding Officer for two (2) reasons: (1) Transmission of three (3) messages, two (2) of which were to clear up communication difficulties caused by our inability to decode a badly garbled message. (2) Navigational difficulties caused by an unexpected easterly set of 3.5-4 knots, coupled with long periods of overcast skies, during which no star sights could be obtained.

It was unfortunate that the situation was such that the Commanding Officer was unable to finish off the carrier The stern tubes should have been fired, even though the data on the TDC was not very accurate.

In the night attack on the vessel tentatively identified as a tanker, six torpedoes should have been fired, as it evidentally was a valuable target to have such a heavy escort. Visibility was such that the target could not be positively identified.

The material condition of this boat is fair to good, but is showing signs of deterioration, through two major and several minor casualties. A thorough Navy yard overhaul is recommended to return her to first class fighting trim. There are two inherent weaknesses that are a continual source of trouble, particularly when attempting to evade: (1) The terrific din set up by the trim and drain pumps; (2) Leaky exhaust valves which makes pumping necessary.

In the past year this vessel has completed four (4) war patrols, plus the long trip from the East Coast. There are on board, several officers and men who have been with the ship since commissioning, and are anxious to remain on board. If this vessel is given an overhaul after this patrol, it is recommended that these men, plus any other deserving cases, be sent back to the States on leave. This will help to maintain the high state of the morale now existent on this vessel.