Eleventh War Patrol

September 9, 1944 - November 8, 1944

Commanding Officer - Lieutenant Commander M.H. Rindskopf

Sinkings and Damages - USS Drum (SS-228) War Patrol Eleven

Image courtesy of History on CD-ROM.

Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

(A) Prologue
(B) Narrative
(C) Weather
(D) Tidal Information
(E) Navigational Aids
(F) Ship Contacts
(G) Aircraft Contacts
(H) Attack Data
(I) Mines
(J) Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasion Tactics
(K) Major Defects and Damage
(L) Radio
(M) Radar
(N) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions
(O) Density Layers
(P) Health, Food, and Habitability
(Q) Personnel
(R) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used
(S) Duration
(T) Factors of Endurance Remaining
(U) Radio and Radar Countermeasures
(V) Remarks

(A) Prologue

Arrived Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., from tenth war patrol on August 14, 1944. Normal refit was accomplished by Submarine Base and Submarine Division 43. Air conditioning unit and booster blower installed in control room. Was dry-docked to pack shafts with sand and accomplish routine bottom and sea valve work. Fired Mark 18 test shots from bow tubes successfully.

Ensign J.M. Sullenger, U.S.N., was detached and Lieutenant (jg) P.J. Connolly, U.S.N.R., reported aboard for duty.

Seven days were spent in training during which two Mark 23 and one Mark 18 exercise torpedoes were fired. Night wolfpack exercises were conducted with U.S.S. SAWFISH and U.S.S. ICEFISH.

Readiness for sea September 9, 1944.

(B) Narrative

(C) Weather

In the Suriago Strait area, the weather was generally overcast with a gentle to moderate breeze. Condition 2 to 3 sea was average, with visibility only fair.

In the Luzon Strait area of the South China Sea, the predominant characteristic of the weather was the consistent moderate to fresh breeze from the northeast, with a condition 3 to 4 sea. The average cloud cover was from 0.2 to 0.6. Visibility was good.

In the two days spent in the northwest section of the area, in the lee of Formosa, the wind dropped to a gentle breeze and the sea to condition 2.

(D) Tidal Information

In the Surigao Strait area, the offshore current was neglegible. In the proximity of the 100 fathom curve, the flood and ebb tides caused a westerly and easterly set, respectively. Due east of Suluan the ebb set was northeasterly. The maximum set encountered was 1.5 knots with the average being about 0.6 knot.

As to be expected, the currents in the Luzon Strait area of the South China Sea, were large and variable. Fortunately, both weather and enemy air activity were such as to allow good morning stars before diving and good evening stars after surfacing shortly after sunset. Also, it was possible to surface for an LAN on morning or afternoon sun as was found necessary.

The following is a tabulated list of the sets and drifts encountered:

(E) Navigational Aids

Suluan Light on Suluan Island at the entrance to Suriago Strait was not lighted. This was the only lighthouse sighted.

Balintang Channel was easily traversed using the SJ radar; Balintang, Batan, and Babuyan Islands all offering good targets.

(F) Ship Contacts

(G) Aircraft Contacts

Aircraft Contacts Continued...

Aircraft Contacts Continued...

Type of submarine camouflage on this patrol - Standard Gray.

(H) Attack Data

U.S.S. DRUM, Torpedo Attack No. 1, Patrol No. 11

Time: 0203 (I) Date: 24 October 1944 Lat. 19-52 N., Long. 118-25 E.

Description:

Four unidentified ships with at least three escorts and air cover. Contacted at sunset by the SJ radar. Night surface attack made in dark night with poor visibility after two attacks had been made by other submarines.

Ships Sunk:

None.

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk:

None.

Damage Determined By:

None.

Target Draft 18 feet, Course 345°, Speed 7 knots, Range 3200 yds.

Own Ship Data:

Speed 4 knots, Course 295°, Depth Surface, Angle --

Type Attack

Night surface attack firing stern tubes. Convoy tracked using SJ radar. Torpedoes fired using solved target course and speed, radar ranges and TBT bearings. During the attack, when at close range to the targets and escorts, all maneuvering was done on the battery.

Sea conditions: 5

Overhaul activity: Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS:

* It is possible that these torpedoes hit the shutters since a thumping, scraping noise was heard as they left the tubes.

** Torpedo record book shows 8809. On board inspection showed 9376.

U.S.S. DRUM, Torpedo Attack No. 2, Patrol No. 11

Time: 0757 (I) Date: 24 October 1944 Lat. 20-27 N., Long. 118-31 E.

Description:

Four ships and one escort identified as follows: one Yasukawa Maru class freighter; one MFM freighter similar to Sanko Maru; one larger MFM freighter; and one MFM freighter, apparently damaged. The escort was an Asashio class destroyer. The attack was made against the Yasukawa Maru class freighter. The other three freighters were in a rough column about 2500 yards to port and 3000 yards astern of the target, on a slightly converging course. The destroyer took station on the starboard bow of the target, after having circled the group as the other ships joined from the south. This was not the same convoy attacked in attack number one. Attack was made in a condition five sea with good visibility.

Ships Sunk:

One Yasukawa Maru class freighter (6710 tons) (EC).

Ships Sunk or Probably Sunk:

None.

Damage Determined By:

Observed first torpedo hit just forward of foremast and second torpedo hit just abaft stack. Heard timed hit by third torpedo at stern. Heard considerable breaking up noises as ship sank.

Target Draft 20 feet, Course 060°, Speed 6.5 knots, Range 2100 yds.

Own Ship Data:

Speed 4 knots, Course 160°, Depth 62 feet, Angle 0°

Type Attack

Submerged periscope attack firing bow tubes. Accepted range of 2100 yards because of probability of zig, target having been on steady course for 17 minutes. No favorable position could be obtained for firing at the remaining ships.

Sea conditions: 5

Overhaul activity: Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS:

* This torpedo was seen to broach before hitting target.

U.S.S. DRUM, Torpedo Attack No. 3A and 3B, Patrol No. 11

Time: 0354 (I) Date: 26 October 1944 Lat. 19-21 N., Long. 120-50 E.

Description:

Thirteen ship convoy composed of ten miscellaneous freighters (those left, identified in Attack No. 5) and three escorts. Contact made on SJ radar in dark night (no moon) with good visibility. Angles on bow could be estimated at firing range. Ships in close formation disposed in three rough columns with escorts patrolling station on either bow and ahead. Convoy zigging on ten minute legs.

Ships Sunk:

One large, 4 kingpost freighter (7500 tons) (EU). Attack 3B.

Ships Sunk or Probably Sunk:

One unidentified freighter (4000 tons) (UN). Attack 3A.

Damage Determined By:

Attack 3B: Heard two timed torpedo hits; saw target burst into flames; saw target burning and exploding before diving two hours later, the convoy having abandoned the ship.

Attack 3A: Heard one timed torpedo hit. Two lookouts watched two ships, in addition to the burning ship, sink. (Attack No. 4 accounts for second sinking ship). Counted ten ships, plus three escorts, in convoy while tracking; counted eight ships (including burning ship), plus escorts, by sight and radar, soon after the attack. Saw seven ships and two escorts during dawn submerged attack. It is definitely known that no ships parted from the convoy from the time of the attack until diving two hours later. The maximum range to the convoy during this period was 12,000 yards. The whereabouts of the third escort at the time of the submerged approach cannot accurately be established. Had he made a sweep from the opposite side of the convoy while we were running ahead, it is possible that he would have been undetected.

3A: Target Draft 16 feet, Course 240°, Speed 8 knots, Range 3600 yds.
3B: Target Draft 22 feet, Course 240°, Speed 8 knots, Range 3100 yds.

Own Ship Data:

Speed 5 knots, Course 005°, Depth Surface, Angle --

Type Attack

Night surface attack firing bow tubes at a group of four or five ships in lines of bearing. Points of aim on two different ships were used, three torpedoes being fired at each. TBT bearings, radar ranges, and visual angles on the bow were used. Again, all maneuvering during the attack was done on the battery.

Sea conditions: 3

Overhaul activity: Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS:

None.

U.S.S. DRUM, Torpedo Attack No. 4, Patrol No. 11

Time: 0357 (I) Date: 26 October 1944 Lat. 19-21 N., Long. 121-50 E.

Description:

Same as Attack 3A and 3B.

Ships Sunk:

One unidentified freighter (4000 tons) (UN).

Ships Sunk or Probably Sunk:

None.

Damage Determined By:

Head two timed torpedo hits for torpedoes 8 and 9; Captain saw ship go down by the head and sink. See Attack No. 3A and 3B.

Target Draft 16 feet, Course 240°, Speed 8 knots, Range 3050 yds.

Own Ship Data:

Speed 7 knots, Course 155°, Depth Surface, Angle --

Type Attack

Continuation of Attack No. 3A and 3B. Swung hard right after firing bow tubes and fired stern tubes at a ship in the near column, astern of the original targets. Used TBT bearings, radar ranges and visual angle on bow.

Sea conditions: 3

Overhaul activity: Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS:

None.

U.S.S. DRUM, Torpedo Attack No. 5A and 5B, Patrol No. 11

Time: 0652 (I) Date: 26 October 1944 Lat. 19-00 N., Long. 120-45 E.

Description:

Same convoy as attacks 3 and 4. Convoy now consists of seven freighters (one is probably a Maru escort) and two PC escorts. The freighters were identified as follows: one Yamakaze Maru freighter; one Kaisyo Maru freighter; one unidentified MFM well-deck freighter; one MFM freighter larger than Kaisyo Maru; and two engines aft, freighters similar to Hokko Maru. Attack begun in poor visibility before dawn and completed in twilight with good visibility.

Ships Sunk:

None.

Ships Damaged:

One Yamakaze Maru class freighter (6921 tons) (EC) Attack 5A.

One MFM freighter, larger than Kaisyo Maru (5000 - 6000 tons) (EU) Attack 5B.

Damage Determined By:

Saw #1 torpedo hit under foremast of Yamakaze Maru, blowing debris out far side.

Heard timed hits from #5 and #6 torpedoes. They hit the second target, a 5000 ton to 6000 ton MFM freighter larger than the one identified as a Kaisyo Maru type.

Both these ships were seen one hour and a half after the attack. The first target's section forward of the bridge was listed to starboard and his back may have been broken. The second target was smoking heavily aft. He was seen five hours after the attack, still smoking, in nearly the same position.

5A: Target Draft 22 feet, Course 215°, Speed 7.5 knots, Range 2100 yds.
5B: Target Draft 18 feet, Course 205°, Speed 7.5 knots, Range 1600 yds.

Own Ship Data:

Speed 4 knots, Course 355° - 348°, Depth 62 feet, Angle 0°

Type Attack

Periscope attack on convoy attacked three hours previously on surface. Drum found itself in the middle of the convoy after running at standard speed submerged to reach the track. The ships were then zigging on three minute legs, necessitating frequent changes of target. Three torpedoes were fired at the largest ship as soon as he steadied after zigging. If he had remained on this course, a better shot could have been obtained by closing the track but it was feared he would zig again soon. Four torpedoes were intended to be fired at this target but the fourth went astray due to a control error. It is not known why the second torpedo did not hit the target. Having observed the first torpedo hit under the foremast, with the spread used, the second torpedo should have hit aft. The remaining two torpedoes were fired at a closer target with a large gyro angle on a sharp track.

Convoy disposition at time of firing:

Sea conditions: 3

Overhaul activity: Pearl Harbor, T.H.

REMARKS:

* One of these torpedoes exploded 2 minutes and 42 seconds after #2 had left the tube. See Narrative, entry of 0655-47.

(I) Mines

On 28 October 1944, at 1102 (I), a decrepit floating mine was encountered in Lat. 19-54 N., Long. 126-26 E. It was sunk by 20mm fire, not exploding when hit.

(J) Anti-Submarine Measures and Evasion Tactics

In the Surigao Strait area, the indications of the Jap radar on the APR (probably on Suluan Island) were the only evidence of the presence of a Jap in any form! No planes were seen; no sampans or patrol boats were encountered. Because of the lack of enemy activity, it is difficult to evaluate the APR contacts. Many times the APR indication was at saturation and appeared to be on us. No offensive action was ever taken against us. It is therefore doubtful if we were ever contacted.

In Convoy College, night radar search planes were encountered on several occasions. On the two occasions during which the planes approached to the closest range, indications pointed to the presence of two planes making the sweep. Again saturation echoes were obtained and it appeared that the enemy radar was "steady on". We did not dive and no offensive action was taken by the enemy.

The convoy encountered on the night of October 23-24, 1944, had at least one radar equipped escort and air cover. As before, saturation echoes were obtained on the APR off and on during a period of about five hours. During one fifteen minute period, we ran at a range of 3000 yards from the convoy and were never molested by an escort. Later, however, upon approaching within 6000 yards of the convoy, two escorts detached themselves and chased us. We could not have been sighted.

The second convoy attacked, on the morning of October 24, had one destroyer as an escort. He was pinging on 17 K.C. After the attack, he administered a very poor depth charging as we evaded at 315 feet under a fine gradient, using the conventional "fish tailing" tactics while running at 80 turns. The Yasukawa Maru freighter sunk was making 6.5 knots - 60 turns. For about three hours after the attack, a small freighter, smoking heavily, remained in the vicinity. He was pinging on 17 K.C. and it was obvious that he was a Maru escort offering himself as "BAIT".

The escorts with the convoy attacked in the early morning of October 26, 1944 showed no indications of having radar. They were pinging on 17 K.C. throughout the time the convoy was tracked. After the daylight submerged attack against the same convoy, we evaded at 325 feet again under a good gradient. The depth charging was not very accurate as we escaped to the northwest at 80 turns. During the first fifteen minutes of the evasion, both conning tower sound gears were out having failed upon the order to take her down. Evasion was done by the JP. The Yamakaze Maru freighter damaged was making 8 knots - 90 turns.

(K) Major Defects and Damage

Engineering

The #2 auxiliary engine was out of commission during the entire patrol because of a broken lower crankshaft. The casualty occurred on September 11, 1944 or 50.4 engine hours on service at normal auxiliary loads since overhaul. A superficial inspection of the engine showed no other material failures or any apparent reason for the casualty.

On October 12, 1944, a cracked jacket liner was discovered on #1 unit of #2 main engine. In no way did this irregularity hinder the engine's performance as was evident when 19.2 knots were required to gain attack position on an enemy convoy. The jacket liner will be replaced in refit as part of the normal 1500 hour overhaul of #2 main engine.

The present I.C. motor generators are of insufficient capacity to carry the normal I.C. load on one unit. This necessitates continuous operation of both units while cruising on the surface.

(L) Radio

The following is a resume of the reception of the new submarine fox schedules in the Luzon Straits area of the South China Sea for the period October 16 to October 26, 1944.

The 4155 China broadcast was well received.

(M) Radar

The SJ radar functioned in a satisfactory manner throughout the patrol. In the Surigao Strait area, 3000 feet peaks were regularly picked up over 100,000 yards and 1100 feet peaks at 70,000 yards. Of the two convoys encountered, one was detected at 25,000 yards and one at 30,000 yards, both being easily tracked at 15,000 yards or more.

SJ radar material failures were limited to six tubes, and the main power switch on the control unit. In the latter instance, the switch was shorted out and the IC-MG selector switch was used in its place.

For the first time in seven patrols no difficulty was experienced with the SJ motor generator.

The SD radar was used intermittently going to and from the area and performed satisfactorily with no material failures.

The APR-SPA radar detector functioned satisfactorily. (See Radio and Radar Countermeasures for contacts).

SJ radar interference from friendly submarines was encountered every night going to and from the area and every night while in the South China Sea - sometimes from as many as three submarines. No other type of interference was encountered on the SJ or on the SD radars.

(N) Sound Gear and Sound Conditions

At the beginning of the evasion after the submerged attack on October 26, 1944, both conning tower sound gears went out. This was caused by the unexplainable burning out of the line fuses. After these were replaced, it was found necessary to replace the QC-JK selector switch as the selsyn in the conning tower would not follow.

Sound conditions in the Luzon Straits area of the South China Sea were poor to fair. Marked decrease in sound ranges was noted at deep submergence during evasion.

(O) Density Layers

For the first time since the installation of the bathythermograph, favorable traces were recorded. The average gradient to 300 feet in the Surigao Strait area was only 4° but in the Luzon Strait area of the South China Sea, gradients of 10° were encountered. Evasion after the submerged attacks on October 24 and 26 was considerably simplified by the good gradients. During neither counter attack did the escort make a good sound contact on us. Below is a record of the traces obtained.

(P) Health, Food, and Habitability

The general health of the crew during this patrol was excellent. Two minor cuts and one case of gastro-enteritis resulted in the loss of three man-days.

The food was palatable and well-prepared throughout the patrol.

This being the first submerged patrol by the Drum in over a year, a few days passed before all hands accepted the fact that the boat would not be as cool as when surface cruising. The installation of the additional air-conditioning unit and blower in the control room improved the habitability of the forward section of the ship considerably. Surfacing for a few minutes at noon for a sun sight, as was done frequently, made the boat noticeably more comfortable during the day.

(Q) Personnel

Daily school for unqualified men was held by the unqualified officers, each officer being responsible for a group of four or five men. This method has proved advantageous to both officers and men.

Traveling in company with another submarine enroute to the area was decidedly helpful to the fire control party. Daily tracking drills using the SAWFISH as target were held enroute from Pearl to Saipan. Training dives and controllerman drills were also held.

(R) Miles Steamed - Fuel Used

(S) Duration

(T) Factors of Endurance Remaining

Limiting Factor of This Patrol:

Expenditure of torpedoes

(U) Radio and Radar Countermeasures

Interception of Enemy Radar Transmissions:

1. Ship or station - U.S.S. DRUM (SS-228)

2. Area covered on this mission (give dates) - Surigao Strait, September 28 to October 13, 1944.

3. Enemy radar was land based.
(a) Enemy installation was not definitely located; but probably on Suluan Island.

4. Intercept equipment - APR-1, TN-2A#43, TN-3-APR#38, and AN-SPA-1#429.

5.
(a) Frequency 149-154 Mc. Dial readings 149-154
(b) PRF 400-450 CPS How measured - SPA meter
(c) Pulse width - 8-10 Micro seconds How measured - SPA meter
(d) Sketch pulse

(e) Lobe switching was not used.
(f) Polarization of enemy signal
(g) Sweep rate - RANDOM - hand train indicated

6. Was radar used for surface or air search, GL, SLC, GCI, or AI - Unknown.

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc. - The enemy radar signal was contacted within a radius of 25 miles of Suluan Island. A number of times, at varying ranges from ten to twenty miles, it appeared as though he had contacted us but no counter action was taken.

Interception of Enemy Radar Transmissions:

1. Ship or station - U.S.S. DRUM (SS-228)

2. Area covered on this mission (give dates) - Luzon Straits of the South China Sea, October 15 to October 26, 1944.

3. Enemy radar was airborne.

4. Intercept equipment - APR-1, TN-2A#43, TN-3-APR#38, and AN-SPA-1#429.

5.
(a) Frequency 151-152 Mc. Dial readings 151-152
(b) PRF 900-950 PPS How measured - SPA meter
(c) Pulse width - 8 Micro seconds How measured SPA meter
(d) Sketch pulse

(e) Lobe switching was not used.
(f) Polarization of enemy signal
(g) Sweep rate - RANDOM

6.
(a) Radar was used for surface search.
(b) Evidence for this conclusion - locality in which signal was contacted.

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc. - Action similar to that in preceding report. Saturation echoes were maintained over a period of about 15 minutes but enemy apparently did not make contact as no counter action was taken. Not possible to estimate his range.

Interception of Enemy Radar Transmissions:

1. Ship or station - U.S.S. DRUM (SS-228)

2. Area covered on this mission (give dates) - Luzon Straits of the South China Sea, October 15 to October 26, 1944.

3. Enemy radar was shipborne.

4. Intercept equipment - APR-1, TN-2A#43, TN-3-APR#38, and AN-SPA-1#429.

5.
(a) Frequency 151-152 Mc. Dial readings 151-152
(b) PRF 900-950 PPS How measured - SPA meter
(c) Pulse width - 10-11 Micro seconds How measured SPA meter
(d) Sketch pulse
(blank)
(e) Lobe switching was not used.
(f) Polarization of enemy signal - none.
(g) Sweep rate - RANDOM

6.
(a) Radar was used for surface search.
(b) Evidence for this conclusion - locality in which signal was contacted.

7. Action of enemy radar, including distances and bearings at which he searched, tracked, faded, etc. - Again similar to the preceding reports. It will be noted that this radar is similar to that described as being airborne in the previous report. It is believed that this signal emanated from an escort of a convoy. Echoes to saturation were maintained during a five hour period. It is not possible to estimate at what range we were contacted.

(V) Remarks

1. Mark 18 Torpedo Information

Eight Mark 18 torpedoes were carried aft on this patrol for a period of 41 days. Very little difficulty was experienced in handling and maintaining them. No grounds were experienced (other than two in the charging leads furnished the ship); no watering was necessary and only four hydrogen eliminator wires burned out. The torpedo poppet roller on one tube was replaced with a mine poppet roller when it appeared that the clearance was too great for the poppet to function properly. Evidently one torpedo had a smaller outside diameter as the original roller functioned with another Mark 18 torpedo. The periods between charges averaged seven days. The average gravity drop was 14 to 18 points. The battery temperature averaged 90°F before charging and 105°F after charging.

On attack number one, a thumping and scraping noise was heard as the torpedoes left #9 and #10 tubes. It is possible that these torpedoes struck the shutters on leaving the tube. This may have been caused by the pitching and tossing of the ship in the heavy sea.

Although the maintenance problem of the Mark 18 torpedoes carried proved them practical and satisfactory, the Commanding Officer regrets having had electric torpedoes aft.

In the areas of Convoy College the advantage of the wakeless torpedo is negligible. The sea is consistently rough (averaging 3-4) and many of the attacks are night surface attacks.

I believe firmly in the high speed of the Mark 23. In any area where rough weather can be expected, I prefer to carry Mark 23 torpedoes fore and aft.

2. The Wolfpack

I sincerely regret that Drum was ordered to patrol Surigao Strait for the first three weeks of the patrol. The short time spent in the wolfpack composed of the SAWFISH and ICEFISH, under Commander A.B. Banister, USN, in SAWFISH was most enjoyable.

The one short rendezvous, while in the areas was necessitated by a change in plans because of the carrier strikes on Formosa and Luzon. The remainder of the time was spent in individual patrol, in the areas assigned - with the advantage of knowing that assistance was close at hand in case of a contact.

Communications, both by radio and SJ radar, were held to a minimum but functioned smoothly when they were used.